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The Case Against Oral Argument
The Effects of Confirmation Bias on the Outcome




Scholars have long been divided over the role, function, and signif-
icance, if any, of oral argument in judicial decision-making.' Federal courts
seem similarly divided, as some circuits routinely grant oral argument in
almost every case, while others grant oral argument in only a small
fraction of appeals. This divide should not be dismissed as merely an idio-
syncratic debate or as a response to excessive workload, particularly when
one considers that approximately 53,000 appeals were filed in federal
courts of appeals in the year ending September 30, 2016.2 Since the
Supreme Court grants certiorari in only approximately eighty cases each
year, federal courts of appeal essentially act as the final arbiters of many
* Director, Legal Writing Program, Notre Dame Law School. I would like to thank the Association of Legal Writing Directors
and Lexis Nexis for generously providing a grant to fund this research. I would also like to thank my wonderful former
research assistants, Paul Kerridge and Lavarr Barnett. Any errors are mine.
1 See, e.g., Warren D. Wolfson, Oral Argument: Does It Matter? 35 IND. LAW REV. 451, 454 (2002). Wolfson concludes that
oral arguments may have an effect, although probably only in five to ten percent of cases. In contrast, Spaeth and Segal
suggest that oral argument matters very little because judges decide cases based on policy preferences and political leanings.
JEFFREY SEGAL & HAROLD SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 280, 430-35 (2002).
Segal and Spaeth are widely credited with developing the attitudinal theory. See RYAN A. MALPHURS, RHETORIC AND
DISCOURSE IN SUPREME COURT ORAL ARGUMENTS: SENSEMAKING IN JUDICIAL DECISIONS 28 (Routledge Press 2013),
crediting Segal and Spaeth for the attitudinal model. See also Jeffrey A. Segal & Albert D. Cover, Ideological Values and the
Votes ofSupreme Court Justices, 83 AM. POL. SC. REV. 557 (1989) (reviewing study providing support for attitudinal theory).
2 See federal courts management statistics 2016, http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data-tables/Table2.02.pdf (last
visited January 15, 2017). That number does not include data from the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. See id.
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legal issues. That means that how the federal courts decide appeals, and
the process through which they reach those decisions, including the
granting or withholding of oral arguments, are important to the adminis-
tration of justice.
Rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure gives judges fairly
broad discretion about whether to hear oral argument. The rule permits
judges to dispense with oral argument if a panel of three judges who have
examined the briefs and record unanimously agrees that oral argument is
unnecessary because
(C) the facts and legal arguments are adequately presented in the
briefs and record, and the decisional process would not be significantly
aided by oral argument.
Some courts interpret this as indicating that oral argument ought to
be the rule, rather than the xception,4 others the reverse. For courts that
view the rule as requiring oral argument in the absence of a valid reason
not to have it, this requirement places enormous pressure on judges, given
the number of appeals that are filed. However, routinely hearing oral
argument is an effective use of judicial resources only if oral argument
really does make a difference to the outcome of cases by aiding the
decision-making process and advancing the administration of justice.
Consider the divergent approach taken by two federal circuits in their
interpretation of Rule 34(c). The Eleventh Circuit, one of the busiest
federal circuits with more than 5,000 appeals filed in 2015,6 hears oral
argument in somewhere between ten and twenty percent (10-20%) of the
3 Rule 34(2) of Federal Rules of Appellate practice, https://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/frap/rule_34 (last visited Apr. 10, 2017)
provides as follows:
(2) Standards. Oral argument must be allowed in every case unless a panel of three judges who have examined
the briefs and record unanimously agrees that oral argument is unnecessary for any of the following reasons:
(A) the appeal is frivolous;
(B) the dispositive issue or issues have been authoritatively decided; or
(C) the facts and legal arguments are adequately presented in the briefs and record, and the decisional process
would not be significantly aided by oral argument.
4 This is the approach taken by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.
5 The Eleventh Circuit is an example of a circuit that hears oral argument in only approximately one fifth of the cases that
come before it. This is a result not only of the sheer volume of cases that are filed but also the court's belief that in most cases
the matter may be decided on the briefs. See Mike Skotnicki, A Peek Inside the Chambers: How the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals Decides Cases, BRIEFLY WRITING, Apr. 9, 2012, https://brieflywriting.com/2012/04/09/a-peek-inside-the-chambers-
how-the-eleventh-circuit-court-of-appeals-decides-cases/ (last visited Apr.10, 2017).
6 See federal courts management statistics 2015, http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data-tables/stfj
b7_1231.2015.pdf (last visited Jan. 15, 2017). Additionally, Judge Urbina of the Eleventh Circuit stated that it is the practice of
the Court to hear oral arguments only in about 20% of the cases. See Skotnicki, supra note 5, at 2.
7 According to 2016 statistics provided by the United States Federal Courts of Appeals, in the Eleventh Circuit 92.3% of cases
were disposed of based on the briefs. See http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data-tables/jb-bl00930.2016.pdf (last
visited Apr. 10, 2017).
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cases filed.7 In contrast, the Seventh Circuit's practice is to hear oral
argument in almost every case of the nearly 2,500 appeals8 filed in that
circuit, unless the parties do not request oral argument.9 While the
Eleventh Circuit certainly has a heavier case load, no one would suggest it
takes its duties and responsibilities less seriously because it hears fewer
oral arguments. This dichotomous approach by the two circuits raises the
question, How important is oral argument to a fully considered resolution
of a case? If it is useful or even essential, are circuits that do not routinely
avail themselves of oral arguments shortchanging litigants? Or, if oral
argument makes little to no difference in the eventual outcome, are
circuits that routinely hear oral arguments using judicial resources effec-
tively?
To determine the answer to those questions, we have to examine both
what judges themselves say about how, if at all, oral argument may
influence case outcomes and examine what actually occurs during oral
argument. Scholars and judges routinely describe oral argument as a
"conversation" between the bench and counselo and a "conversation"
among the judges on the bench.1 Analyzing these "conversations" and
then examining case outcomes in light of what took place at oral argument
may provide us with insight about the role of oral argument in judicial
decision-making.12
This article describes a study conducted on the oral-argument process
at the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. The purpose of the study was to
broadly analyze the "conversations" that took place during one hundred
oral arguments in which any one or combination of three specific judges-
Rovner, Posner, and Easterbrook-participated, in an attempt to discern
whether particular characteristics of the oral questioning provided insight
regarding case outcomes. Specifically, I analyzed whether the number of
questions posed to each side was significant with respect to the case
8 See id.
9 Richard Posner, Judicial Opinions and Appellate Advocacy in Federal Courts-One Judge's Views, 51 DUQ. L. REV. 3, 8
(2013) ("My court allows oral argument in all cases in which both sides have counsel; most of these are civil cases but a
substantial minority are criminal:')
10 RYAN C. BLACK, TIMOTHY R. JOHNSON, & JUSTIN WEDEKING, ORAL ARGUMENTS AND COALITION FORMATION ON
THE U.S. SUPREME COURT-A DELIBERATE DIALOGUE 10 (2012). See also Talbot D'Alemberte, Oral Argument: The
Continuing Conversation, 25 LITIGATION 12 (1999) wherein D'Alemberte cites a conversation with Justice Overton of the
Florida Supreme Court in which Justice Overton told him, "[y]ou should think of your [oral] argument as the beginning of the
judicial conference, and you are privileged to be there:'
11 BLACK ET AL., supra note 10, at 85-86. See also LAWRENCE WRIGHTSMAN, ORAL ARGUMENTS BEFORE THE SUPREME
COURT: AN EMPIRICAL APPROACH 40 (2008), in which the author cites Justice Kennedy describing oral argument as the
"Court having a conversation with itself through the medium of attorneys:'
12 I realize that discussions among judges at conferences that occur after oral argument, as well as the circulation of draft
opinions are also extremely important factors, and I acknowledge this in part V of the article. However, there is little infor-
mation available about these processes to consider their roles in the decision-making process.
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outcome and whether the tone and content of the questions portended
any particular outcome." I then analyzed the decisions in each of those
cases to determine if the outcome had been foreshadowed in the
exchanges that took place between the bench and counsel during oral
argument. I also researched whether any of the judges had previously
expressed any strong opinions about the types of cases before them, and
whether the expression of a previous opinion seemed to play any role in
the ultimate decision.
The obvious problem in examining the data proffered by oral
argument is that it is extremely difficult to intuit which way judges were
leaning on a case prior to oral argument, and how, if at all, oral argument
factored into the decision-making process, absent the unlikely event of
judges choosing to tell us.14 However, several political scientists have
conducted studies on United States Supreme Court oral arguments and
found that the side that is asked more questions during oral argument will
likely lose the case." The likelihood of that side's losing is further
increased if the tone and content of the judges' questions evince skep-
ticism or hostility towards that side.16 This suggests that if a judge is
skeptical about a particular side's arguments, she would have more
questions for that side. A judge's skepticism may be evidenced by the tone,
manner, or type of questions posed to the side that ultimately loses-
specifically, when the judge poses questions in a hostile or adversarial way,
connoted by word choice, tone, and affect.'7 Hence, all of these factors
were examined in my study.
If one may intuit a judge's initial leanings on a case by the number,
tone, and content of her questions,8 one may then look to the outcome of
the case and determine whether it was the expected outcome (i.e., the side
that was asked more hostile questions lost) or contrary to expectations.9
13 As described in more detail in part IV infra, I evaluated the questions as neutral, hostile, or friendly. These evaluations
were based on the judges' tone of voice, word choice, and the nature of the questions.
14 All of the judges in my study, as I discuss in part IV, have expressed some concern about he quality of the decisions of the
Social Security Administration and immigration judges. Thus, they may be predisposed to regard decisions with some skep-
ticism when petitions for review come before them.
15 Timothy R. Johnson, et al.; Inquiring Minds Want to Know: Do Justices Tip Their Hands with Questions at Oral Argument
in the L.S. Supreme Court? 29 WASH. U. J.L & POLY 241, 259-60 (2009).
16 Sarah Levien Shullman, The Illusions of Devil's Advocacy: How the Justices of the Supreme Court Foreshadow their
Decisions during Oral Argument, 6 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 271-72 (2004).
17 See Johnson et al., supra note 15, at 259-60.
18 I realize that assessing tone is subjective. Moreover, a judge may evince a neutral tone in questioning and yet be hostile
towards a particular position advanced by counsel (content hostile). In the study I had several raters listen to the questions
posed in the oral arguments, and if we did not agree on the tone, it was coded as a neutral question.
19 Most judges, including the judges in this study, aver that oral argument changes their mind somewhere between 10% and
20% of the time. Thus we might expect the outcome of a case to deviate from the predicted outcome somewhere between
10% and 20% of the time. In this study, the number proved to be about 10% of the time.
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If the outcome is not as predicted, one might infer that oral argument
played a role in changing a judge's initial predisposition towards the case.2 0
This article will contend that despite judges' generally averring that
they are open to changing their minds on cases during oral argument,2 1 in
practice they are predisposed not to do so because they often approach
oral argument with a particular inclination regarding the outcome. This
inclination may be based on legal precedent, procedural issues, bias, or
any combination of those and additional unknown factors. I suggest that,
rather than remain open to being persuaded during oral argument, judges
often reinforce their initial predisposition by posing hostile questions to
the side that they are predisposed against.2 2 I argue here that the very tone,
nature, and number of a judge's questions may subconsciously both reflect
and reinforce that judge's bias. In other words, I posit that a judge's initial
bias or leanings on a case may be confirmed by the type of questioning she
initiates, which then effectively prevents the judge from changing her
mind about the outcome of the case a process known as confirmation
bias.23 Because I infer that confirmation bias may result in oral argument's
being used as a method of reinforcing initial bias, I suggest that oral
argument may not be an effective use of judicial resources.
Part II of this article will describe and analyze the role of oral
argument in judicial decision-making, primarily through canvassing
studies done on Supreme Court oral arguments. Some of these studies
suggest hat oral argument is important in the decision-making process,
while others suggest the converse.24 I then discuss judges' views on oral
argument and the potential ways in which interactions between the bench
and counsel during oral argument may signal the outcome of a case. In
20 Of course a judge may be persuaded by her colleagues during the judicial conference, or in writing or reading the draft
opinion. Some judges have observed that when drafting an opinion on occasion it just "won't write, which indicates a flaw in
the judicial reasoning and causes them to change their mind. See ABA Council of Appellate Lawyers, Justice Scalia at the
AEJI Summit in New Orleans, APP. ISSUES, Feb. 2013, at 4, http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/
appellate-issues/2013win ai.authcheckdam.pdf. Justice Scalia noted in that interview that at least in the Supreme Court
conferences, the justices do not try to persuade each other and that a justice very seldom changes his or her mind. Id. at 2.
20 Judge Myron Bright of the Eighth Circuit along with two of his colleagues conducted a study in which he found that oral
argument changed his mind in 31% of the cases that came before him, his colleagues respectively changed their minds in 17%
and 13% of the cases. Myron H. Bright, The Power of the Spoken Word: In Defense of Oral Argument, 72 IOWA L. REV. 35, 40
nn. 32-33 (1986).
22 I argue in part III infra that this is a form of "confirmation bias," a recognized psychological phenomenon. See generally
Charles Lord, Lee Ross, & Mark Lepper, Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polarization: The Effects of Prior Theories on
Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 2098 (1979).
23 Confirmation bias is a widely observed phenomenon whereby people seek out and interpret information that is consistent
with their expectations. Ivan Hernandez & Jesse Lee Preston, Disfluency Disrupts the Confirmation Bias, 49 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 178, 178 (2012).
24 Proponents of the attitudinal model like Segal and Spaeth, supra note 1, aver that most cases are decided on the basis of a
judge's preexisting attitude and ideology, which would suggest that oral arguments are not that important. Additionally,
according to an article in the ABA Journal, Justice Alito reportedly asserted that "oral arguments aren't all that important,
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part III of this article, I describe the phenomenon of confirmation bias and
suggest how it may play out in the type and numbers of questions posed to
each side during oral argument. Part IV will describe the results of a study
I conducted on a database of oral arguments before the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals that generally reinforces the findings found in the
Supreme Court studies. Part V then addresses the contentions that oral
argument might nevertheless serve a valid role in making justice visible or
refining judicial opinions, even if confirmation bias is found to play a role
in oral argument itself. Parts VI and VII conclude the project by
suggesting that oral argument may not be an effective use of judicial
resources and that information sought by the bench during oral argument
might better be obtained by means of written questions posed to the
respective parties.
II. The Role and Function of Oral Argument in Judicial
Decision-Making
Rule 34 presupposes that oral argument may play a crucial role in the
decision-making process, particularly in close cases. Indeed, common
wisdom suggests that oral argument helps judges decide cases.25 Not
everyone agrees with this seemingly obvious contention.26 Some would
assert that oral argument serves little purpose and that cases may more
expeditiously be decided on the briefs.2 7 Others argue that oral arguments
are merely "window dressing" justice and that cases have already been
decided or will be decided on ideological grounds.28 Yet many judges
themselves tell us that oral arguments serve to clear up points of confusion
despite a popular belief to the contrary." Debra Cassens Weiss, Think Oral Arguments Are Important? Think Again, Justice
Alito Says. ABA JOURNAL May 17, 2011, http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/think-oral arguments-are_ important
think-again alito-says/?from=widget (last visited Apr. 17, 2017).
25 See generally Cynthia Kelly Conlon & Julie M. Karaba, May It Please the Court: Questions about Policy at Oral Argument,
8 Nw. J. LAW & SOC. POLY 89 (2012).
26 For example, Justice Alito suggested otherwise during a visit at St. Louis Law School, telling attendees that oral argument
is unimportant. See Deb Peterson, Supreme Court Justice Samuel Alito Speaks at St. Louis Law Day, STL TODAY, May 16,
2011, htpp://www.stltoday.com/news/local/columns/ deb-peterson/article_873af5a6-8008-11e0-8324-001a4bcf6878.html.
Also, note the example of the Oklahoma Supreme Court discussed in infra part II.A.2.
27 Judge Ruggero Aldisert of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals was a proponent of this approach, noting, "[T]he recent
astronomical increase in appellate court caseloads emphasizes the importance of briefs and diminishes the grandness of oral
arguments:' Ruggero Aldisert, Perspective From the Bench, 75 MISS. L.J. 645, 648 (2006). Judge Urbina of the Eleventh Circuit
also supports it with caveats, noting, "[I]n many cases, the helpfulness of oral argument is overrated. It can, however, make
the difference in a close case. . . Joel E Urbina, From the Bench: Effective Oral Advocacy, LITIGATION, Winter 1994, at 3, 4.
See also Joe Cecil and Donna Stienstra, who argue that based on their study of four federal courts of appeals "judges generally
agree that there are many cases in which oral argument will not inform the disposition of a case." JOE CECIL, DONNA
STIENSTRA, DECIDING CASES WITHOUT ARGUMENT: AN EXAMINATION OF FOUR COURTS OF APPEALS 157 (Federal
Judicial Center 1987).
28 Timothy R. Johnson, Paul J. Wahlbeck & James E Spriggs II, The Influence ofOralArguments on the L.S. Supreme Court,
100 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 99 (2006) (citing SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 1, at 280).
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and really can and do make a difference in the outcome of the case.29 They
contend that arguments made by counsel may sway them if they are
undecided, or even cause them to change their minds.3 0 I will explore each
of these arguments, and go on to suggest that rather than using questions
to clarify points of contention during oral argument, judges may be
subconsciously questioning counsel so as to elicit confirmation of preex-
isting biases.
A. Oral Argument Serves No (or Little) Purpose
Several political scientists have long asserted that oral argument
serves no valid purpose as judges essentially decide cases based on their
own beliefs on the issues.1 Segal and Spaeth christened this theory the
"attitudinal model;' and conducted several studies that indicate a strong
correlation between a judge's ideological or political leanings and case
outcomes.3 2 This theory is more applicable to Supreme Court arguments
than Courts of Appeals arguments, as the Supreme Court decides more
politicized cases, and the selection of Supreme Court justices has become
a hyperpoliticized process.
1. Cases are Decided on the Basis of the Attitudinal Model
Segal and Spaeth discount the role of oral argument,3 4 asserting that
cases are often decided along ideological lines." The evidence for this
claim is based on studies conducted on Supreme Court oral arguments, 36
and thus might have less validity when applied to appellate-court
29 Justice Blackmun posited that oral arguments were helpful, adding that "many times confusion (in the brief) is clarified by
what the lawyers have to say." Philippa Strum, Change and Continuity on the Supreme Court: Conversations with Justice Harry
Blackmun, 34 U. RICH. L. REV. 285, 298 (2000).
30 Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks on Appellate Advocacy, 50 S.C. L. REV. 567, 570 (1999).
31 See generally SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 1. See also MALPHURS, supra note 1 (crediting Segal and Spaeth with
developing the attitudinal theory).
32 Id. See also Segal & Cover, supra note 1.
33 In a 2016 speech, Chief Justice Roberts pointed out that Justice Scalia had been confirmed by a vote of 98 to 0, but the
votes for "more[-]recent colleagues, all extremely well qualified for the court[,] ... were . .. strictly on party lines for the last
three of them, or close to it, and that doesn't make any sense. That suggests to me that the process is being used for
something other than ensuring the qualifications of the nominees'" Adam Liptak, John Roberts Criticized Supreme Court
Nomination Process Before There Was a Vacancy, N.Y. TIMES Mar 21, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/22/us/
politics/john-roberts-criticized-supreme-court-confirmation-process-before-there-was-a-vacancy.html?_r=0 (last visited
Apr. 10, 2017). See also Richard A. Posner, The Supreme Court Is a Political Court. Republicans'Actions Are Proof WASH.
POST. Mar. 9, 2016.
34 SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 1, at 430-35.
35 This attitudinal model is endorsed by other scholars. See, e.g., THOMAS HANSFORD & JAMES SPRIGGS, THE POLITICS OF
PRECEDENT ON THE U.S. SUPREME COURT (2006); VIRGINIA HETTINGER, STEFANIE LINDQUIST, & WENDY MARTINEK,
JUDGING ON A COLLEGIAL COURT: INFLUENCES ON FEDERAL APPELLATE DECISION MAKING (2006); DAVID KLEIN,
MAKING LAW IN THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS 91 (2002).
36 See, e.g., James C. Phillips & Edward L. Carter, OralArgument in the Early Roberts Court:A Qualitative and Quantitative
Analysis oflndividual Justice Behavior, 11 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 325 (2010); WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 11, at 132 etseq.
describing the various studies that have been conducted on Supreme Court oral arguments.
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arguments, for which fewer studies have been conducted. 7 Proponents of
this position argue that a justice's vote on a case reflects that justice's
values, emotions, attitude, and political leanings.8 Wrightsman claims
that "these attitudes and values serve as filters and cause the decision
maker to pay more attention to those arguments upporting his or her
bias, denigrating those arguments that do not " 9 In a Supreme Court that
has become more divided among ideological lines, this argument holds
some sway.4 0 Songer and Link additionally point out that even critics of
the attitudinal model have had to concede that "the ideological values and
policy preferences of Supreme Court justices have a profound impact on
their decisions in many cases."4 1 This model may have less validity when
applied to Courts of Appeals whose caseload may be less politically
charged.
If a judge's ideology plays a deciding role in case outcomes, oral
argument may then be of little value.4 2 Though other scholars concur with
that conclusion, their explanation of why this is so is based on reasons
other than the attitudinal model.43
2. Oral Argument Is Not Important because Cases Are Decided on the
Briefs
The Oklahoma Supreme Court appears to wholeheartedly endorse
the view that the briefs determine the outcome of cases. In Oklahoma,
oral argument is rarely granted, as Rule 1.9 requires parties to file a motion
setting forth the "exceptional reason that oral argument is necessary.4 4
Over a ten-year period, the Oklahoma Supreme Court decided over one
thousand cases, all but twelve without oral argument.45 Although this
37 Epstein, Landes, and Posner also point out that ninety-
eight percent of decisions in federal appellate courts are
unanimous. LEE EPSTEIN, WILLIAM M. LANDES, RICHARD
A. POSNER, THE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL JUDGES 54 (2013).
Thus I infer that it is more difficult to determine how or if
ideology played a role in the decision-making process.
38 TIMOTHY R. JOHNSON, ORAL ARGUMENTS AND
DECISION MAKING ON THE UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT, 13-17 (2004). See also Erwin Chemerinsky, The
Meaning of Bush v. Gore: Thoughts on Professor Amar's
Analysis 61 FLA. L. REV 969, 970 (2009) ("[F]irst, Justices
have tremendous discretion i deciding constitutional cases;
and second, how that discretion is exercised is frequently, if
not inevitably, a product of the Justices' life experiences and
ideology.")
39 WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 11, at 30.
40 See generally MICHAEL A. BAILEY & FORREST
MALTZMAN, THE CONSTRAINED COURT: LAW, POLITICS,
AND THE DECISIONS JUSTICES MAKE (2012). Bailey and
Maltzman acknowledge that law in the form of precedent
does matter, too, but that it is difficult to determine the
precise roles played by judges' ideological and policy pref-
erences from the role played by precedent. Id. at 47.
41 Donald Songer & Jessica Link, Debunking the Myths
Surrounding the Attitudinal Model of Supreme Court
Decision Making at *2 (Presentation to Annual Meeting of
American Political Science Association, Sept. 2, 2010),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=16445
73 (internal quotation, citation omitted).
42 WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 11, at 33. For example, in the
2001 Supreme Court term, when deciding cases involving
prisoners' rights, the three most conservative justices sided
with the state on all but two occasions out of a possible
twenty-four votes, the four liberals on the Court found in
favor of the prisoners with twenty-eight of a possible thirty-
two votes. Id. at 33-34.
43 See MALPHURS, supra note 1, at 28.
44 Okla. Sup. Ct. R. 1.9 (emphasis added).
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approach has its critics, 46 the court largely continues this practice,
although the Court of Criminal Appeals hears oral arguments in all death
penalty cases.4 7
Other examples cited in support of the proposition that cases be
decided on the briefs concern cases where a justice is not present for oral
argument or even the judicial conferences, but nevertheless goes on to
write the majority opinion in those cases. For example, Wrightsman noted
that in 2004, then-Chief Justice Rehnquist missed oral arguments in forty-
four cases because he was being treated for thyroid cancer.48 Not only did
he miss the oral arguments, he missed the conferences too.4 9 Despite his
absence from both arguments and conferences, Rehnquist assigned
himself to write the opinions in four of those cases.s0
Another example of the briefs' mattering more than oral argument
may be seen in the approach taken by the California Supreme Court. The
California Supreme Court does hear oral arguments on all cases unless
waived by the parties, but often uses oral argument to "test" the limi-
tations of a "calendar memorandum":" After reading the parties' briefs,
the justices meet to discuss the case and formulate a draft opinion, which
they then test out through the process of questioning during oral
argument.5 2 Obviously, the justices reach their tentative opinion based on
the parties' briefs but are ostensibly open to having their minds changed,
or at least, their opinions modified, by oral argument, if it appears there
are shortcomings in their initial approach.
B. According to Judges, Oral Argument Can Make a Difference in
a Small but Significant Number of Cases
Despite the suggestions made that oral arguments may not matter
much in the final determination of a case, comments from judges them-
selves seem to suggest hat they do, at least in the minds of some judges.
For example, in 1981, the U.S. Supreme Court contemplated (at Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor's suggestion) not hearing oral arguments in all of
the cases, as it had accepted an unusually high number of cases that year."
Justice Powell had some misgivings, responding, "I could agree with
45 Joseph Thai & Andrew Coats, The Case for Oral 50 Id. The cases were Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93 (2005),
Argument in the Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 61 OKLA. L. Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1 (2005), Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S.
REV 695, 695 (2008). 208 (2005), and Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 607 (2005). Id.
46 See generally id. 51 See THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 22,
47 Okla. Crim. App. R. 3.8. http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/The SupremeCourt
of California Booklet.pdf (last visited Apr. 10, 2017).
52 Interview with Justice Carol Corrigan, California
49 Id. Supreme Court, in at Notre Dame, Mar. 25, 2013 (on file
with author).
53 WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 11, at 9.
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[Justice O'Connor's] proposed change [but] my only concern is that we
might abuse this privilege. I believe in the utility of oral argument, and also
in the symbolism it portrays for the public."5 4
Other judges too, have spoken out regarding their belief that oral
argument plays a valuable role in the decision-making process. For
example, Chief Justice Rehnquist noted,
Lawyers often ask me whether oral argument "really makes a difference"
Often the question is asked with an undertone of skepticism, if not
cynicism, intimating that the judges really have made up their minds
before they ever come to the bench and oral argument is pretty much a
formality. Speaking for myself, I think it does make a difference; in a
significant minority of cases in which I have heard oral argument, I have
left the bench feeling differently about a case than I did when I came to
the bench. The change is seldom a full one-hundred-and-eighty-degree
swing, and I find it is most likely to occur in cases involving areas of law
with which I am least familiar.5
Rehnquist's point that oral argument may assist he judges particularly
with regard to areas of law with which they are unfamiliar has been
echoed by Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit, who has pointed out that
judges are generalists,56 whereas the lawyers arguing a case have attained a
specialized knowledge of the law and facts in that case and thus may be
able to assist the bench. Even Justice Scalia, initially dismissing oral
arguments as a "dog and pony show,"' later noted that "things can be put
in perspective during oral arguments in a way that they can't in a written
brief.58
Federal Circuit judges overall seem to endorse the view that oral
arguments do matter, at least in a small but significant number of cases.
Based on interviews conducted with judges by Bryan Garner, it seems
clear that many judges believe that oral arguments may affect the outcome
of cases.9 Judges have also noted that occasionally a lawyer is a better
54 Id. at 9 (second alteration in original).
55 Id. at 39 (citation omitted).
56 RICHARD POSNER, REFLECTIONS ON JUDGING, 269 (2013). "In all likelihood he [the judge] is a generalist, lacking
specialized knowledge of most of the fields of law that generate the cases that come before him. The advocate, in contrast,
probably is a specialist . . . ."
57 WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 11, at 40 (citing DAVID M. O'BRIEN, STORM CENTER: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN
POLITICS 260 (2000)).
58 Id.
59 See interviews by Bryan Garner with Supreme Court Justices and federal judges, http://www.lawprose.org/bryan-
garner/garners-interviews/. Most judges reported that oral arguments may make a difference in the outcome of the cases in
a small number of cases. See id.
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"talker than writer;' suggesting that on occasion oral argument may be
more persuasive than briefs.6 0
The judges analyzed in the study conducted for this article also seem
to believe that oral argument may change their minds on cases. Judge
Rovner has noted that "oral argument can make a difference [in] the
outcome of a case,"61 and estimated that oral argument changed her mind
in 15 to 20 percent of the cases she hears.62
Judge Posner also claimed that "although the average quality of oral
arguments in federal court . . . is not high, the value of oral argument to
judges is very high.' 6 Judge Easterbrook similarly suggested that oral
argument can make a difference in between 5 to 10 percent of cases.6 He
also avers that advocates may lose their case at oral argument by not
responding appropriately to the judges' questions.65
The fact that judges seem to believe that oral argument can be
significant may itself affect their behavior, in that they may treat it as
significant and act accordingly. This phenomenon has been studied by
sociologists, and is known as the "Thomas Theorem. 66 The theorem
suggests that what lay people term "self-fulfilling prophecies" may have
some foundation in science. As noted sociologists W.. Thomas and
Dorothy Swaine Thomas put it, "[I]f men define situations as real, they are
real in their consequences."67 Thus, if judges believe that they can be
persuaded by oral argument, they may be more likely to take it seriously
and ostensibly may be open to changing their minds about a case as a
result of oral argument.
C. Reading the Tea Leaves: Oral Argument and the Signaling
Function
Regardless of whether judges believe that oral argument might change
their minds on a case, oral argument may perform various other
important functions. Among these functions are providing a forum
whereby counsel, interested parties, and their fellow judges on the bench
60 See WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 11, at 40-41 (citation omitted).
61 Kathleen Dillon Narko, They Are Listening, 22 CBA REC. 54,54(2008) (alteration in the original).
62 Id.
63 RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 160-61 (1999).
64 Interview by Bryan Garner with Judge Frank Easterbook, Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals (2011) at 4:39,
http://vimeo.com/23818679.
65 See generally id. This opinion is also held by Justice Ginsburg who noted, "I have seen few victories snatched at oral
argument from a total defeat the judges had anticipated on the basis of the briefs. But I have seen several potential winners
become losers in whole or in part because of the clarification elicited at oral argument' Ginsburg, supra note 30, at 570.
66 See Robert K. Merton, The Thomas Theorem and the Matthew Effect, 74 Soc. FORCES 379, 379-80 (1995).
67 Id. at 380 (citation omitted).
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may derive some insight into a particular judge's position on a case
through the tone and tenor of that judge's questions. I refer to this as a
signaling function. This is important because judges generally do not tell
us which way they are leaning on a case before oral argument. It is thus
impossible to show how, or if at all, oral arguments change judges' minds.
We are left to surmise from a judge's questions the position she might
intend to take and then subsequently look at the opinion to see which way
the judge voted.
It is not surprising, therefore, that observing questions posed by
particular judges during oral argument and speculating on the impli-
cations of those questions has spawned a cottage industry of court
watchers, particularly in Supreme Court cases.68 Though the speculation
might seem unscientific, studies have shown that merely noting if more
questions are posed to one side enables an observer to predict that the side
posed the most questions will ultimately lose the case.69 One's accuracy in
predicting the outcome increases if one is able to denote that more hostile
questions were posed to that side.70
The signals put out by a particular judge are not only available for the
parties and court watchers to observe, but are also available to a judge's
fellow judges. These signals may play a role in judicial efficiency in that
they potentially shorten the time needed during the judicial conference to
decide the case, as the rest of the panel may well be aware which way their
colleagues are leaning by the signals they have put out.
1. Signaling to One's Colleagues on the Bench
It seems to come as no surprise to most judges that their colleagues
on the bench tip their hands during argument. Former Chief Justice
Rehnquist pointed out that "[t]he judges' questions, although nominally
directed to the attorney arguing the case, may in fact be for the benefit of
their colleagues."7 1 Justice Kennedy concurred, noting that during oral
argument "the Court is having a conversation with itself through the inter-
mediary of the attorneys."7 2
68 See, e.g., Jonathan Adler, Things We Learned at Today's Oral Argument in King v. Burwell, WASH. POST, Mar. 4 2015,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/03/04/things-we-learned-at-todays-oral-argument-in-
king-v-burwell/?utm term=.7c697254e800 (last visited Jan. 27, 2017).
69 Ryan C. Black, et al.; Emotions, Oral Arguments, and Supreme Court Decision Making 73 J. POL. 572, 572 (2011); EPSTEIN
ET AL., supra note 37, at 316, acknowledging that "the losing party is indeed asked more questions.'
70 Id.
71 WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME Court 244 (2001).
72 WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 11, at 40 (citing DAVID M. O'BRIEN, STORM CENTER: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN
POLITICS 260 (2000)).
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If a judge signals her position, the other judges may choose to signal
back their concerns, or they may remain silent and raise any concerns
during the judicial conference.73
Even if a judge disagrees with the signaled outcome, she will still have
to weigh whether she will ultimately vote against her colleague(s) in
conference. This is where the collegiality factor may come into play.74 Will
it affect one's relationships with one's peers if a particular judge disagrees
or concurs? Is this worth sacrificing potential leisure time or other
income-producing-activity time to author a dissent or concurrence?75
Signaling through oral argument may thus lead to judicial efficiency,
shortening conference time because judges may go into conference
knowing each other's positions on the cases. Posner notes that in
conferences, judges "for the sake of collegiality often pull their punches
when stating their view how a case should be decided."76 However, the
kinds of questions judges may ask during oral argument may also play an
additional role-that of confirming the initial bias a judge may hold in
respect of the argument advanced by one party.
2. Signaling and Foreshadowing the Outcome: Confirming Initial Bias
As noted, several studies conducted on Supreme Court cases have
shown that the party asked the most questions during oral argument will
typically end up on the losing side.77 This is particularly true when the
questions posed to that party are pointed or hostile.7'
73 Johnson argues that there is clear evidence that Justice Powell istened to the questions of his colleagues and used them as
a basis for forming coalitions for a majority opinion. TIMOTHY R. JOHNSON, ORAL ARGUMENTS AND DECISION MAKING ON
THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 126 (2004). One example of judges signaling to each other may be heard in the oral
argument for Brown v. EMA, 546 U.S. 786 (2010), a case involving the sale of violent video games to minors. The recording is
available at https://www.oyez.org/cases/2010/08-1448. At about the 12:30-minute mark, Justice Kennedy notes, "It seems to
me all or at least the great majority of the questions today are designed to probe whether or not this statute is vague . . . and
this indicates to me that the statute is vague." As for the judicial conferences, EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 37, suggest hat
judicial conferences are "curiously stilted" with judges merely stating their position and casting their vote. The authors note
that it is a "serious breach of etiquette to interrupt a judge when he has the floor" at 62. Posner also finds the conferences
stilted, noting that "[o]nce a judge has indicated his vote in the case, even if tentatively, concern with saving face may induce
him to adhere to the vote in the face of the arguments of the other judges, who moreover may be reluctant to press him to
change his mind, feeling they'll offend him by doing so." Posner, supra note 56, at 129. It is thus difficult to intuit how much
robust discussion takes place at the judicial conferences.
74 See Harry Edwards, The Effects of Collegiality on Judicial Decision Making, 151 U. PA. L. REV 1639, 1645 (2003) (arguing
that "collegiality plays an important part in mitigating the role of partisan politics and personal ideology").
75 Judge Posner has devised an equation devoted to how a judge maximizes his time, positing that judges with permanent
tenure might be influenced by the utility derived from judging, leisure time, reputation, and the desire to avoid reversal that
may result in "go along voting:" See generally Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Things
Everyone Else Does), 3 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1 (1993). See also Joanna Shepherd, Measuring Maximizing Judges: Empirical
Legal Studies, Public Choice Theory, and Judicial Behavior, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1753.
76 RICHARD A. POSNER, REFLECTIONS ON JUDGING 129 (2013).
77 Lee Epstein, William M. Landes, and Richard A. Posner, Inferring the Winning Party in the Supreme Court from the
Pattern of Questioning at Oral Argument, 39 J. LEGAL STUD. 433 (2010).
78 See Johnson et al., supra note 15, at 259-60.
57
LEGAL COMMUNICATION & RHETORIC: JALWD / VOLUME 14 / 2017
Johnson and his colleagues have established that the party asked the
most questions was more likely to lose the case.7 9 They analyzed
transcripts of all Supreme Court cases from 1979 to 1995, including
2,000 hours of argument and approximately 340,000 questions.so The
researchers counted the number of questions posed to each side, and also
the number of words in each question to determine if the justices asked
the losing side longer questions." They then used a multivariate analysis
to determine whether there were correlations between a higher number of
questions posed, the length of questions, and losing the case.82 Johnson
also factored in the ideological nature of the case and coded the justices
based on ideological leanings." The study also factored amicus briefs filed
by the Solicitor General into the equation, as cases in which the Solicitor
General's office files a brief tend to be decided in favor of the
government.8 4 The study confirmed what smaller studies had already
suggested-the more questions a party was asked during oral argument,
and the longer the questions, the more likely that party was to lose the
case.ss That result held true even when the researchers factored in other
variables for why the justices might decide a case a particular way.86
Other studies have suggested that it is not just the number of
questions posed to each side that matters, but rather it is the way in which
those questions are posed that is significant, specifically whether the
questions are hostile or friendly.7 Ryan Black and his colleagues analyzed
the word choice of the Supreme Court justices in oral arguments from
1979 to 2008.88 Using the Dictionary of Affect in Language to gage the
emotional content of the justices' words, they coded the words for affect to
determine whether the linguistic behavior of justices telegraphed their
views of the issue.89 The researchers found that there was a strong corre-
lation between words coded as unpleasant (reflecting strong emotional
content) and a vote against the party to whom a justice used those words
in questioning.90
250. more questions during Supreme Court oral arguments).
86 See Johnson et al., supra note 15, at 259-60.
251-53. 87 Shullman, supra note 16, at 290.
254. 88 See Black et al., supra note 69, at 574-75.
255. 89 Id. at 575.
ee also R.C. Black and Ryan J. Owens, Solicitor 90 Id. at 576-77.
Influence and Agenda Setting on the United States 91 WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 11. Wrightsman and his
Court (Mar. 10, 2010), https://papers.ssrn.com/ collaborator, Jacqueline Austin, analyzed twenty-four cases
ers.cfm?abstract-id=1568381 (last visited Apr. 1, from the Supreme Court's 2004 term and determined that
the number of questions and their hostile content were good
pstein et al., supra note 77, at 433 (finding "strong predictors of an adverse outcome. Id. at 140-41.
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The idea that justices telegraph or tip their hands through the tone
and number of questions has been confirmed by Lawrence Wrightsman,9 1
Epstein, Landes, and Posner,92 as well as by Sarah Shullman.93 In
examining the tone, nature (hostile vs. friendly), and number of the
questions posed to each side by the justices, Shullman confirmed that the
justices did indeed telegraph their positions on the issue by asking more
questions and more hostile questions to the party who ultimately lost.9 4
Shullman refers to this as "foreshadowing" because her research estab-
lished that the form of questioning did indeed predict the justices'
ultimate decision.9 5
From a psychological-theory perspective, there is nothing surprising
in the finding that a side that is asked more hostile questions would end up
losing. The theories of confirmation bias and belief perseverance may be
at play here.9 6 As noted, confirmation bias suggests that if one holds a
particular view on an issue, then one tends to seek confirmation of, or
evidence to support that belief.9 7 Similarly, the theory of belief perse-
verance contends that individuals have "the tendency to cling to one's
initial beliefs even after receiving new information that contradicts or
disconfirms the basis of that belief."98 These theories will be discussed
more thoroughly below.
3. Framing Questions to Support Confirmation Bias or Belief
Perseverance
Aside from signaling to one's fellow judges, the kinds of questions that
a judge poses during oral argument may perform another ole-that of
eliciting answers that support one's inherent biases or beliefs about a
particular case. Framing questions in a particular way may lead to answers
being given that support the ruling that a judge ultimately wants to issue.
92 Epstein et al., supra note 77, at 433.
93 Shullman, supra note 16, at 290.
94 See id
95 See id
96 See generally Craig A. Anderson, BeliefPerseverance, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 109 (R.E Baumeister
& K.D. Vohs eds., 2007).
97 Judge Posner even acknowledges that this may be the case, noting, "My colleagues and I read the same briefs, hear the
same oral arguments and sometimes react quite differently, either because of different priors, which can dominate . . . the
probability one attaches to a decision one way or another after gathering evidence' Epstein et al., supra note 77, at 130.
Elsewhere Posner has noted that "[t]he tools I am calling priors can in principle and sometimes in practice be overridden by
evidence. But often they are impervious to evidence, being deeply embedded in what we are, and that is plainly true of
judging... Richard A. Posner, The Supreme Court is a Political Court. Republicans'Actions are Proof WASHINGTON POST,
MAR. 9, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-supreme-court-is-a-political-court-republicans-actions-are-
proof/2016/03/09/4c85 1860-e142- 1 1e5-8d98-4b3d9215ade lstory.html?utm-term=.a2dc260c4a0d (last visited Apr. 10,
2017).
98 Id. at 109.
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A judge may do this, often subconsciously, as a way of justifying the
outcome of a case. The process of framing questions so as to elicit
evidence to support a particular outcome is part of a process termed
"confirmation bias" by psychologists.99 Moreover, it seems likely that in
some cases, no matter what answer a judge might receive to her questions,
she may persist in her belief about how the case should be decided-a
form of "belief perseverance." I will describe these phenomena below and
suggest that they may be responsible for the increased number and more
hostile tone of questions asked to the losing side.
Ill. The Possible Roles of Confirmation Bias and Belief
Perseverance in Oral Argument
Confirmation bias has been described by Nickerson as selectively
gathering or giving undue weight to evidence that supports one's position
and "neglecting to gather or discounting evidence that would tell against
it."1 00 The process may be subconscious and even unmotivated. It is a
phenomenon that has been documented in multiple instances and
circumstances over a long period of time.101 Nickerson describes how
people acting under the influence of confirmation bias "often tend to only
or primarily seek information that will support their hypothesis or belief
in a particular way."102 This may explain why the phenomenon is
sometimes referred to as "myside bias."03 Even when confronted with
arguments or evidence that run counter to their hypothesis, individuals
who operate under confirmation bias tend to give greater weight to the
information that supports their belief, discounting or seeking to explain
away the counter information.' 0 4
This is not to say that judges who may act under the influence of
confirmation bias do so because they have a vested interest in the outcome
99 Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guises, 2 REv. GEN. PSYCHOL. 175, 175
(1998). 1 am not aware of any studies that have been done on confirmation bias in oral argument.
100 Id.
101 As far back as 1620, Francis Bacon posited, "The human understanding when it has once adopted an opinion (either as
being the received opinion or as being agreeable to itself) draws all things else to support and agree with it. And though there
be greater number and weight of instances to be found on the other side, yet these it either neglects or despises or else by
some distinction sets aside and rejects; in order . .. that the authority of its former conclusion may remain inviolate:' FRANCIS
BACON, NOVUM ORGANUM Book 1 (1620) Aphorism XLVI, http://www.constitution.org/bacon/nov org.htm (last visited
Apr. 10, 2017).
102 Nickerson, supra note 99, at 177.
103 Jonathan Baron, Myside Bias in Thinking about Abortion, 7 J. THINKING & REASONING 221, 221 (1995).
104 Kuhn notes that even when presented with evidence that contradicts their theory, people suffering from confirmation
bias either fail to acknowledge the contradictory evidence or distort it in some way. Deanna Kuhn, Children and Adults as
Intuitive Scientists, 96 PSYCHOL. REV. 674, 677 (1989).
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of the case. Studies have shown that the discounting of counterevidence
and the seeking out of evidence to support one's position occurs even
when individuals have no real stake in the truth value of their hypotheses
(i.e. the outcome of the case).10s The theory of confirmation bias thus
provides another possible explanation, aside from the attitudinal model, as
to why judges ask more questions of the losing side-it may be that they
are seeking out information to support their innate hypothesis of the case,
even though they may have no real stake in the outcome.
Moreover, it may be well founded for a judge to approach a case with
a bias towards a particular side and that bias may not be indicative of any
attitudinal or ideological bias on the part of the judge. It could merely be
an indication that the judge is aware of relevant mandatory or persuasive
precedent or policy and seeks confirmation whether the case before her
falls within the parameters of that authority.
However, judges need to be conscious of potential bias, as a danger
exists that judges may find what they are looking for when seeking to
confirm an initial response.'0 6 Nickerson points out that
[g]iven the existence of a taxonomy[,] ... there is a tendency to view the
world in terms of the categories it provides. One tends to fit what one
sees into the taxonomic bins at hand. In accordance with the confir-
mation bias, people are more likely to look for, and find, confirmation of
the adequacy of a taxonomy than to seek and discover evidence of its
limitations.107
Nickerson refers to this process as "reification."10 Reification occurs
when we think the taxonomic bins we are putting things into are actual
reality, and we interpret information in accordance with that view.109 To
my knowledge, no study has been conducted on appellate judges and
confirmation bias, but if one considers precedent or the decision of the
lower court as "taxonomic bins" into which appellate judges are trying to
fit the law and facts of the case before them, it is not hard to imagine that
judges would much rather find a case analogous to existing precedent or
consistent with the decision of the lower court, than find that precedent
should be distinguished and the lower court reversed.10 An example of
105 Nickerson, supra note 99, at 176. 109 Id.
106 Posner refers to these biases as "priors" cautioning 110 Obviously the common law is predicated on the
judges to be aware of their own priors, whether these be for premise that judges will decide cases in accordance with
the "police; for paramedics; for asylum seekers; for people precedent, but that still leaves judges with the choice of
with serious mental illnesses; and for marginal religious whether the case before them is analogous to precedent or
sects. He may have a range of antipathies as well ..... may be distinguished. As Epstein, Landes, and Posner point
POSNER, supra note 56, at 129-30. out, judges may have another motivating factor in deciding
107 Nickerson, supra note 99, at 183-84. that the case before them is analogous to precedent as they,
like everyone else, seek to maximize their leisure time. See
108 Id. Epstein et al., supra note 37, at 42.
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seeking a result that is consistent with one's hypothesis has been seen in
juries. Studies have found that when jurors form a bias towards one side
early on in the case, their final decision is likely to be consistent with that
bias, and jurors are more likely to remember statements hat support their
initial leaning than those that contradict it."'
Moreover, once an individual has formed an early opinion on a
subject, it is difficult to reverse that opinion. This is known as the primacy
effect.12 Thus, even though judges may tell us that they come to the bench
willing to change their minds during oral argument, their initial leaning on
a case may be difficult to overcome. Additionally, judges must surely be
aware, even at a subconscious level, that the appellant's chances of
prevailing on appeal are quite small. Thus if judges approach a case with
an idea of how the case should be decided, are motivated to fit the case
within the framework of existing precedent and affirm the lower court's
decision, and know that that in most cases the appellant loses his or her
appeal, the chances of overcoming one's initial bias and seeking out and
accepting disconfirmatory evidence seem small.
Conceptualizing what occurs during oral argument through the lens
of confirmation bias in one sense builds on, yet departs from, the atti-
tudinal model described by Segal and Spaeth."' Pursuant to the attitudinal
model, judges approach a case with a particular set of political beliefs or
ideological biases. I argue that pursuant o the confirmation bias theory
that I have described, judges often come to the bench with a particular
belief or predisposition regarding how the case should be decided. That
predisposition may not necessarily be based on political or ideological
values but rather could be based on a number of other factors, including
precedent, proceedings in the court below, a particular bias against a
party, or prejudice on a particular issue. I argue further that confirmation
bias may be at work in that judges may consciously or subconsciously
frame their questions in such a way as to solicit answers designed to
confirm these biases. Moreover, even if the answers a judge receives do
not confirm the judge's original impression of the case, a judge may be
more likely to disregard these disconfirmations and persevere in her
original assessment of the case (a characteristic that denotes belief perse-
verance).
The effects of confirmation bias have been documented in various
spheres of activity from medical diagnoses to jury situations.14 Another
111 Id. at 185. 113 See generally Segal and Spaeth, supra note 1, at 221 et
112 Sean Duffy & L. Elizabeth Crawford, Primacy or seq.
Recency Effects inForming Inductive Categories, 36 MEMORY 114 HUGO MERCIER, DAN SPERBER, THE ENIGMA OF
& COGNITION 567, 568 (2008). REASON 271 (2017).
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example derived from a study conducted by Saul Kassim and his
colleagues" provides an additional useful illustration of the theory. In
Kassim's study, two groups of students designated to act as police inter-
rogators were primed to believe that the suspects (also psychology
students) they were about to interrogate were either guilty or innocent of
a mock theft. The priming occurred when one group of interrogators (the
guilty-expectation group) was told that four out of five people that they
would interrogate were guilty of the crime. In contrast, the other group
(the innocent-expectation group) was told that only one person of the five
they would interrogate was guilty. Both groups were then told to select six
questions from a list of questions provided by the experimenters.
Unbeknownst to the participants, twelve of the twenty-four questions on
the list had been coded as "guilt presumptive." Both groups were also
required to select interrogation techniques from a list of techniques
provided by the experimenters. Half of the techniques were coded as high
in coerciveness, half as low in coerciveness. The authors' hypothesis was
that a presumption of guilt would set into motion a more pressure-filled
interrogation." 6 The hypothesis proved to be correct. The authors found
that the group primed to expect guilt chose more guilt-presumptive
questions, used more coercive techniques during interrogation, and were
more likely to judge the suspects guilty than the innocent-presumptive
group."7
Although one should be cautious about reading too much into this
study, it might provide some insight into the behavior of at least some
judges at oral argument in two meaningful ways. First, as suggested above,
if a judge believes that oral argument is important and could affect her
decision on a case, then she might be more likely to participate more fully
and pay more attention to oral argument-this could be seen as akin to the
Thomas Theorem. A converse example of this would be the behavior of
Justice Thomas during oral argument: let us assume, as he himself has
suggested, that he allegedly sees little value in oral argument because the
judges have "made up their minds 99% of the time."''8 His behavior
confirms this through his choice to not participate in oral argument by
refraining from asking questions during argument."'9
115 Saul M. Kassim, Christine C. Goldstein & Kenneth Savitsky, Behavioral Confirmation in the Interrogation Room: On the
Dangers ofPresuming Guilt, 27 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 187 (2003).
116 See id
117 Id. at 199.
118 WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 11, at 25 (citation omitted).
119 According to David Karp, Justice Thomas does not let what occurs during oral argument affect his view of the case. As
an example of this, Karp notes that in Doggett v. United States, Justice Thomas dissented, stating that the Constitution's
guarantee of a speedy trial did not protect a defendant who had waited eight years for trial due to the prosecutor's delays. Yet,
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The second way in which confirmation-bias and belief-perseverance
theories might provide some insight into the behavior of judges during
oral argument is in situations when a judge comes to the bench at oral
argument with a predisposition as to how the case should be decided. This
attitude, predisposition, or bias might influence the tone, types, and
number of questions put to each party. It also might influence the manner
in which a judge might ask those questions. Just as the group in Kassim's
study was primed to believe in the guilt of the subjects they were interro-
gating, and therefore chose more guilt-presumptive questions and
coercive interrogation techniques,120 so too may judges who have a bias
regarding an issue frame a question more hostilely to elicit an answer that
conforms with their bias.
An example of this might be the kinds of questions posed by Judge
Posner to Matthew Kairis, the attorney representing Notre Dame in
University ofNotre Dame v. Sebelius,121 a case in which Notre Dame was
seeking relief from being compelled to provide its employees with contra-
ception, pursuant to the Affordable Care Act, or even formally fill out the
forms that would exempt them from compliance with the Act. Kairis
argued that Notre Dame's Catholic beliefs prohibited it from being
complicit in providing contraceptives to its employees, as the use of arti-
ficial contraception is prohibited by the Catholic Church. Three years
prior to hearing this case, in November 2010, Judge Posner wrote on his
blog in a post entitled Contraception and Catholicism,12 2 "It is always
difficult to decide whether a religious tenet of a hierarchical religion, such
as Roman Catholicism, reflects religious belief or institutional strategy" He
went on to write, "The biggest problem that the Church faces in backing
off its traditional condemnation of contraception is a potential loss of
religious authority, which is no small matter in a hierarchical church."1 2 3
Although Posner's post was directed at the then-pope's uggestion that use
of condoms might be morally justified as a means of saving lives when a
party was afflicted with HIV/AIDs, Judge Posner demonstrated some
fairly strong views about the Catholic Church's position on contra-
ception-as an authoritarian Church seeking to impose its views on its
during oral argument, Justice Thomas did not say a word to hint about his view of the case. Karp argues that by remaining
silent during oral argument, Justice Thomas fails to air his positions to public debate. See David A. Karp, Why justice Thomas
Should Speak at Oral Argument, 61 FLOR. L. REV 611, 624 (2009) (internal citations omitted).
120 See Kassim, supra note 115, at 199.
121 743 F.3d 547 (2014), cert. granted, vacated sub nom Lt. of Notre Dame v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 1528 (2015),
http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/sound/2015/lj.13-3853.13-3853_04_22 2015.mp3 (last visited Apr. 10, 2017).
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followers. Posner's feelings on the subject seemed to manifest themselves
in the tone and types of questions put by Posner to Kairis during the oral
argument in the Notre Dame case.12 4 These views and the manner in
which Posner posed questions2 5 to Kairis seem to indicate confirmation
bias.
Consider this exchange between Posner and Kairis excerpted from the
oral argument in the case:
Posner: Is there some sanction that Notre Dame imposes on employees
or students who use contraception?
Kairis: No.
Posner: Why not? This is a ... well, let me ask you this. Is use of contra-
ception a mortal sin or a venial sin?
Kairis: Your Honor, I don't know the answer.
Posner: Well, you should. It's a mortal sin if the person using contra-
ception knows the Church forbids it. So, if Notre Dame is really serious
about this, why doesn't it do anything about the violations, which
apparently are widespread?
Kairis: Notre Dame has no interest in vetoing or controlling other
people's choices. Notre Dame has an interest in controlling its own
choices.
Posner: You're kidding. The Catholic Church is not interested in
affecting other people's choices?126
Not surprisingly, Judge Posner ruled against Notre Dame in this
case.127 His previous designation of the Catholic Church as an authori-
tarian church afraid of losing its moral authority regarding the issue of
contraception may indicate a form of confirmation bias on this issue as
manifested in the content and tone of his questions to Kairis.
Confirmation bias also seems to be evident in cases before the
Seventh Circuit involving appeals from a denial of social-security disability
benefits or from a denial of political asylum.128 In both of these kinds of
124 See generally the oral argument, note 121, supra.
125 Posner's irritation with Kairis's conduct was obvious throughout the argument. After being frequently interrupted by
Kairis, at one point Posner told him to stop interrupting or Posner would not let him continue with his argument.
126 This exchange begins at the 32:25 minute mark in the oral argument. http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/sound/2015/lj.13-
3853.13-3853_04_22 2015.mp3 (last visited Apr. 10, 2014).
127 The issue is not with Posner's legal ruling in this case, but rather that the tone and content of his questions suggest that
he had already made up his mind and was not going to use oral argument as an opportunity to be persuaded.
128 See, e.g., JAYA RAMJI-NOGALES ET AL., REFUGEE ROULETTE: DISPARITIES IN ASYLUM ADJUDICATION AND PROPOSAL
FOR REFORM 77 (2009), in which Ramji-Nogales suggests hat the Seventh Circuit is often skeptical of the decisions made by
immigration judges. Judge Posner seems to confirm this, noting, "immigration judges are heavily overworked, and the immi-
gration bar is weak . . . . The federal courts of appeals . . . reverse these decisions at a very high rate, often because the
immigration judges and the Justice Department's lawyers display an appalling ignorance of foreign countries .... " Posner,
note 56, supra at 140-41.
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cases, the Seventh Circuit's rate of reversal is far greater than, for example,
the Eleventh or Fourth Circuits,1 2 9 although the Seventh Circuit is clearly
not alone in its criticism of immigration judges.13 0 With regard to immi-
gration appeals, Judges Posner and Rovner have spoken or written
extremely disparagingly about the positions advanced by the Justice
Department in some cases. For example, Judge Posner wrote in one
opinion that "the adjudication of these [asylum] cases at the administrative
level has fallen below the minimum standards of legal justice."1 He has
estimated that the Seventh Circuit reverses immigration-law judges'
decisions thirty-four percent of the time.13 2 The deferential standard of
review that applies in these cases, namely substantial deference, should
mean that reversals are relatively rare. In Ahmad v. INS,"' the Seventh
Circuit itself noted that under the substantial-deference standard, credi-
bility determinations "should only be overturned under extraordinary
circumstances[,]" yet that is not in fact the case.13 4
Judge Posner is not alone in his criticism of the government's
arguments in many immigration cases. During one oral argument Judge
Rovner remarked to Cindy Ferrier, the lawyer representing the
government, "It is so cruel to send a lovely human being like you in here to
be a messenger of such madness, such nonsense.13 5 In yet another case,
the court derided the immigration judge for "factual error, bootless specu-
lation and errors of logic." 13 6 The court went on to note that "[t]hese have
been common failings in recent decisions by immigration judges and the
Board."1 3 7 Not surprisingly, in oral arguments involving immigration cases
129 According to the U.S. Dept. of Justice Immigration Law Advisor's statistics for May, 2015, the Seventh Circuit had a 25%
reversal rate for immigration claims for the months of January through May 2015; the Eighth Circuit had a zero percent
reversal rate for that same period. See John Guendelsberger, Circuit Court Decisions for May 2015, 9 IMMIGR. L. ADVISOR 5,
5 (2015), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/pages/attachments/2015/06/30/ilavol9no6.pdf. Moreover, Jaya
Ramji-Nogales and her coauthors assert that an asylum seeker in the Seventh Circuit has an 1800% greater chance of
receiving a remand in an asylum case than a person living in Virginia, Maryland, West Virginia, or the Carolinas. JAYA RAMJI-
NOGALES ET AL., supra note 128, at 77.
130 Judge Fuentes of the Third Circuit strongly criticized the immigration judge in Wang v. Attorney General, noting, "We
have stressed previously that '[a]s judicial officers [immigration judges] have a responsibility to function as neutral and
impartial arbiters and must assiduously refrain from becoming advocates for either party Here, we find the immigration
judge (IJ) failed that basic requirement:' 423 E3d. 260, 263 (3d Cir. 2005) (internal citation omitted).
131 Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 E3d 828, 830 (7th Cir. 2005).
132 Melissa Harris, Chinese Legal Scholars Hear Words of Wisdom from Judge Richard Posner, http://articles.
chicagotribune.com/keyword/richard-posner/featured/2.
133 163 E3d 457 (7th Cir. 1999).
134 Id. at 461.
135 Cited in Adam Liptak, Courts Criticize Judges' Handling of Asylum Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 2005,
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/26/us/courts-criticize-judges-handling-of-asylum-cases.html?_r=0
136 Pramantarev v. Gonzales, 454 E3d 764, 765 (7th Cir. 2006).
137 Id.
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in my study, substantially more hostile questions are directed at counsel
for the Attorney General than the Appellant.""
Judge Easterbrook, who has a reputation as a textualist39 and conser-
vative jurist, is far more circumspect about expressing his opinions on any
matter outside of court than Judge Posner.140 Yet even he in Banks v.
Gonzalesl4' felt compelled to suggest that the immigration bureaucracy
could well benefit from the use of country experts who could assist immi-
gration judges and asylum officers in determining whether a claimant's
version of events was plausible, given the political situation in a particular
country.142 The immigration process, as it currently stands, left Judge
Easterbrook to bemoan "why ... immigration officials so often stand silent
at asylum hearings and leave the IJ to play the role of country specialist, a
role for which an overworked lawyer who spends his life in the Midwest is
so poorly suited?"14 3
Thus when one considers these prior expressions of opinion, it is
difficult not to intuit that the judges may be skeptical about the
government's position in an immigration appeal. Based on their past expe-
riences with these agencies, the judges in my study seem primed to exhibit
bias against the government.144 This bias often manifests itself in the tone
and content of questions posed to counsel representing these agencies. For
example, in Samirah v. Holder,145 after hearing counsel for the Attorney
General's explanation of why the alien could not return to the U.S. to apply
for an adjustment of status, Judge Posner postulated, "The law cannot be
that ridiculous.'1 4 6 And, "Everything that you say makes the government's
position more ridiculous.'1 4 7
Judge Posner has been similarly critical of the Social Security
Administration in reviewing denial of claims for social-security benefits.
In several opinions he manifested open derision towards decisions of the
138 See study conducted on 100 cases before the Seventh Circuit on file with the author (hereinafter Venter study) described
in part IV.B., infra
139 See John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 VA. L. REV. 419, 420 (2005).
140 There are countless examples of Judge Posner's lack of temperance with the BIA. For example in Ceca] v. Gonzales he
noted, "Suppose you saw someone holding a jar, and you said, 'That's a nice jar,' and he smashed it to smithereens and said,
'No, it's not a jar. That is what the immigration judge did:'
440 E3d 897, 899 (7th Cir. 2006).
141 Banks v. Gonzales, 453 F. 3d 449 (7th Cir. 2006).
142 Id. at 453.
143 Id. at 454.
144 See Venter study on file with the author.
145 627 F.3d 652 (2010).
146 Oral argument at 42:38, http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/sound/2010/migrated.orig.08-1889 09_08_2010.mp3.
147 Id. at 42:28.
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administrative law judges who deny appellants' claims. For example, in
Goins v. Calvin,148 in which the obese plaintiff had a Chiari I malformation
(a condition where the part of the cerebellum and brain stem has been
pushed into the spinal cord) along with a degenerative-disc ondition,
Posner described the administrative law judge's summary of the MRI as
"barely intelligible mumbo jumbo."1 4 9 He went on,
If we thought the Social Security Administration and its lawyers had a
sense of humor, we would think it a joke for its lawyer to have said in its
brief that the administrative law judge "accommodated [the plaintiff's]
obesity by providing that she could never [be required as part of her
work duties to] climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds, and could only occa-
sionally climb ramps or stairs, balance, kneel, crawl, stoop, and/or
crouch".. . Does the SSA think that if only the plaintiff were thin, she
could climb ropes? And that at her present weight and with her present
symptoms she can, even occasionally, crawl, stoop, and crouch?'50
Though it is true we should not assume that judges take the bench as
blank slates in each case, we might expect that they have not prejudged the
case; otherwise oral argument would be unnecessary. It would be naive to
suppose that judges approach each matter without some preconceived
understanding about how the case should likely be decided, as they have
read the briefs and relevant portions of the record, are familiar with the
judicial precedent on point, and have likely read a bench memo on the
case. Still, many of the questions analyzed in the study discussed below
evidence some form of confirmation bias or belief perseverance, bringing
into question the role and value of oral argument.
IV. The Study-Testing the Hypothesis of Whether
Judges Display Confirmation Bias through the
Number and Tone of Their Questions
A. The Judges in This Study
The three judges selected for this study, Rovner, Easterbrook, and
Posner, were chosen for their similar length of experience on the bench,
for their record of asking multiple questions in oral argument, and for the
fact that they had all been appointed by presidents from the same political
party.'5 '
148 764 F.3d 677 (7th Cir. 2014). 150 Id.
149 Id. at 682. 151 The actual party was irrelevant, but I wanted to try and
minimize ideological differences among judges in the study.
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B. The Study-Parameters and Methodology
In this study I listened to one hundred randomly selected oral
arguments from cases heard in 2007 to 2014, wherein at least one of the
three judges listed above (the study judges) constituted a member of the
panel. On several occasions two of the three study judges were on a panel.
In those cases, the questions asked by each study judge were tallied as
separate scores. I counted the number of questions asked of each side by
each of the study judges, as well the total number of questions asked of
each side by judges who were not included in the study (nonstudy judges).
Questions asked by nonstudy judges were also included because these
affect the number of questions that study judges are able to ask, or that
they might want to ask (if for example, a question a study judge might have
is asked by another judge). I also counted the number of questions asked
by the study judges on rebuttal and the total number of questions asked by
nonstudy judges on rebuttal. The database of one hundred cases
comprised civil (45), criminal (29), and administrative agency (26) cases,
which were all coded separately.
I also rated the tone and nature of the questions put to the attorneys
for each side by the study judges to determine if they were hostile, neutral,
or friendly in nature, or if they afforded evidence of confirmation bias. I
discussed these criteria with my research assistants and had them verify
my classification of questions by listening to the oral arguments and inde-
pendently verifying the number of hostile, positive, and neutral questions.
To determine whether the questions were hostile in nature, I
examined the word choice used by judges and listened to the tone of the
question to determine whether it was positive, neutral or negative. I char-
acterized as hostile questions those in which the judge's tone sounded
angry (indicated by a raised voice or word choice like "idiotic" or a phrase
that indicated annoyance or anger), those in which the judge impatiently
interrupted counsel when counsel was attempting to answer a question,
cases in which the judge asked rapid-fire questions barely affording
counsel a chance to answer the question before being asked another, as
well as those questions in which a judge sounded skeptical about counsel's
position. An example of hostile questioning can be seen in the exchange
that is described in part III, supra, between Judge Posner and Attorney
Matthew Kairis, excerpted from the oral argument of University ofNotre
Dame v. Sebelius,'52 in which Posner's questions to Kairis were asked in a
tone of cynicism and disbelief. All questions denoted as hostile were rated
and verified by my two research assistants.
152 743 E3d 547.
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Judge Posner made it easy to characterize questions as hostile by his
tone of voice (which becomes raised and louder) and his interactions with
counsel (in which he often exhorts them to answer his questions more
directly). For example, in Stanojkova v. Holder,'s Judge Posner instructed
counsel in a harsh tone to "[a]nswer yes or no, is that not clear?"'15 4
Moreover, after listening to multiple oral arguments, it became apparent
with respect to Judge Posner that the phrase, "I don't understand. . ." or "I
don't get it . . ." or "no, no, no, no;' often prefaced a hostile question."'
Judge Easterbrook's hostile questions were denoted by his tone of voice,
which becomes louder, more forceful, harsh sounding, and impatient.'16
Judge Rovner's tone does not usually alter, even when asking a hostile
question (which she is less prone to do), but the content of the question
becomes more negative and her voice becomes slightly higher pitched,
which seems to indicate incredulity.
Neutral questions were characterized by unemotional tone and
neutral word choice. Examples of this type of question might be a question
inquiring about facts from the record below, such as, "Did you represent
the defendant at trial?"
I also coded questions that I saw as positive, i.e., that were designed to
assist counsel in making a point favorable to the position that counsel
wanted the court to adopt. Positive questions included those in which the
judge appeared by tone, content or word choice to agree with or respond
favorably to an argument advanced by counsel. An example of this type of
question can be seen in the exchange in Stanojkova v. Holder,17 a case
involving an appeal from the denial of asylum to two ethnic Albanians
from Macedonia." The couple sought asylum, alleging persecution on
the grounds of political opinion and ethnicity or race'5 9 after the police
broke into their house and assaulted them. During the assault, the police
forced the pregnant female appellant to completely disrobe. She was not
raped, although she feared she would be. Their attorney argued that even
though she had not been raped, forced disrobing still amounted to perse-
cution.'60 The immigration judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals
153 645 F.3d 943 (7th Cir. 2011).
154 See http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/sound/2011/migrated.orig.10-3327_06_14_2011.mp3 at 18:30.
155 An example of this can be heard in the Notre Dame v. Sebelius oral argument referenced supra, note 121.
156 For the record, Judge Posner has written that questioning during oral argument should be aggressive. See POSNER, supra
note 56, at 129.
157 Stanojkova v. Holder, 645 F.3d 943 (7th Cir. 2011).
158 Id. at 944-45.
159 The mistreatment of ethnic Albanians by the Macedonian government has been documented since 1999. See REGIONAL
AND ETHNIC CONFLICTS: PERSPECTIVES FROM THE FRONT LINES 10 (Judy Carter, et al., eds., 2009).
160 http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/sound/2011/migrated.orig.10-3327_06_14_2011.mp3.
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had found this act insufficient to constitute persecution.161 The question
below provides an example of a positive question posed by Judge Rovner
to the appellants' counsel:
Judge Rovner: Aren't there cases in which courts have found persecution
based on a sexual assault which did not go beyond disrobing and
groping?162
Counsel: There are your Honor, and thank you for raising that.16
C. Findings
My findings were consistent with studies conducted on Supreme
Court oral arguments, in that in ninety percent of the cases in my study,
the side that was asked more questions lost. In some cases, the disparity
between the number of questions asked of each side was stark. For
example, Judge Posner asked the losing side an average of 11.3 questions
with only 3.4 to the winning side (asking the losing side around three
times as many questions). Judge Easterbrook asked the losing side seven
questions and the winning side four on average, (almost twice as many
questions to the losing side). Judge Rovner asked on average almost three
times as many questions of the losing side by posing 10.4 questions to the
losing side and 3.3 to the winning side.
Though traditionally the losing side is the appellant, as only between
four and sixteen percent of appellants prevail on appeal,164 in the study
sample I looked at, the Seventh Circuit seems to reverse more cases on
appeal than the national average, particularly administrative-law cases, in
which the reversal rate was thirty-eight percent. Moreover, the pattern of
the losing side being asked more questions was consistent, no matter
whether the side that ultimately lost the case was the appellant or the
appellee.
The number of questions posed by the study judges to the losing side
was generally consistent with the number of questions posed by nonstudy
judges to the losing side; i.e., both study and nonstudy judges asked on
average almost twice as many questions to the losing side as they did to
the winning side. There were ten cases in which this did not occur. One
might speculate that the nonstudy judges had a difficult time getting an
161 Stanojkova v. Holder, 645 E3d 943, 946 (7th Cir. 2011).
162 http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/sound/2011/migrated.orig.10-3327_06_14_2011.mp3 at :58.
163 http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/sound/2011/migrated.orig.10-3327_06_14_2011.mp3 at 1:03.
164 Theodore Eisenberg, Appeal Rates and Outcomes in Tried and Nontried Cases: Further Exploration ofAnti-Plaintiff
Appellate Outcomes, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 659, 659 (2004). The author explains that there are different rates of
success depending on whether it is the former plaintiff or defendant who is appealing. Id.
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opportunity to ask questions in some of these cases because the study
judges were relatively active questioners.
The exchanges between counsel on the losing side and the bench were
also markedly more hostile with the tone of the judges, their choice of
words, their tone, and their willingness to interrupt and disagree with a
contention advanced by counsel being markedly more unfriendly to the
side that ultimately lost the case. On average, the three study judges each
asked three or four hostile questions per argument to the losing side and
none to the winning side. The number of questions varied depending on
whether the arguments were long or short arguments. In short arguments,
each side is limited to ten minutes, while in long arguments each side
generally gets twenty minutes or even more. The questions to the losing
side also began much earlier in counsel's argument, commencing almost
immediately after counsel approached the podium.
The judges also seemed to be framing the questions in such a way so
as to obtain support for a preexisting premise or bias. In all of the cases
where I saw evidence of confirmation bias, the side asked questions that
suggested confirmation bias lost the appeal. For example, in Baskin v.
Bogan,16 a challenge to Wisconsin's statutory ban on same-sex marriage,
Judge Posner asked counsel for the State of Wisconsin "why are all those
obstacles thrown in the path of these people?"166 And, "[s]o traditionper se
is not a ground for continuing. So we have been doing this stupid thing for
a hundred years or a thousand of years, we'll keep doing it because it s
tradition. Don't you have to have some empirical or common sense reason
justifying it?"' 6 7 It should be noted that Posner had said in a June 2014
interview with Joel Cohen, prior to hearing oral argument in Baskin- Wolf
that he was "much less reactionary than [he] used to be;' noting that he
had previously been opposed to same sex marriage but that "was still the
dark ages regarding public opinion of homosexuality. Public opinion
changed radically in the years since. My views have changed about a lot of
things. "168
Posner's obvious irritation with the Attorney Generals in the
Baskin-Wof cases,169 and with counsel for Notre Dame in the Notre Dame
165 766 F.3d 648 (7th Cir. 2014) (hereinafter "Baskin-Wolf"). This case was consolidated with Wolfv. Walker because the
two cases involved the same issue. Note that the phrase "stupid thing" foreshadows the outcome.
166 http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/rssExec.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2014/DO9-04/C:14-2526:J:Posner:aut:T
fnOp:N:1412339:S:0 at 3:10.
167 Id. at 4:30.
168 Cohen's interview with Posner is available at Joel Cohen, An interview with Judge RichardA. Posner, ABA JOURNAL (Jul.
1, 2014, 10:20 AM CDT), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/an i terview with judge-richard-a._posner/.
169 766 F.3d 648 (7th Cir. 2014).
72
THE CASE AGAINST ORAL ARGUMENT
caseo7 0 due to their inability to answer his questions to his satisfaction,
may also have influenced the judges in writing their opinions. Judges are
only human and may become irritated or even enraged at counsel if the
judges feel their questions are not being answered or counsel is being
disingenuous. Counsel's behavior may make the tone of the opinion much
more harsh, which in turn may influence the lower court or administrative
law judge when they reconsider the matter. For example, in his written
opinion on the Baskin-Wolf cases,17 1 Judge Posner specifically referred to
counsel's unpersuasive answers during oral argument. After reciting the
Indiana Attorney General's response at oral argument to a question about
whether Indiana's prohibition on same-sex marriage was about
"successfully raising children;' Judge Posner derided that argument in the
opinion, concluding, "Heterosexuals get drunk and pregnant, producing
unwanted children; their reward is to be allowed to marry. Homosexual
couples do not produce unwanted children; their reward is to be denied
the right to marry. Go figure."1 72 It is unclear whether Judge Posner's
comments were prompted by counsel's inability to proffer a reasonable
justification for the state's ban on same-sex marriage or were based on
Posner's "prior" belief that prejudice against homosexuals belongs in the
"dark ages."'7 Judge Posner similarly referenced the inadequate answers
of Wisconsin's Attorney General in his written opinion.
However, judicial experience, along with the further opportunities
that judges have to consider the case during conference and the drafting
process, mean that a judge's annoyance with counsel's behavior during oral
argument would not generally translate into counsel's losing the case on
that basis.17 4 In the Supreme Court, for example, the poor performances of
advocates does not seem to jeopardize their cases, despite the fact that
Justice Ginsburg has suggested that one may lose one's case at oral
argument.' 7 There are several examples of an advocate performing partic-
ularly badly during oral argument but nevertheless going on to win the
case. For example, the oral argument performance of Solicitor General
170 743 E3d 547 (7th Cir. 2014).
171 766 E3d at 662.
172 Id.
173 See Cohen, supra note 168.
174 Most judges are able to separate their annoyance at counsel from the merits of the case before them. An example of this
can be seen in the opinion handed down in LnitedStates v. Boyd, 475 E3d 875, 876-77 (7th Cir. 2007) where the court noted,
"We are ... distressed at the sloppiness with which the case has been handled by both sides.. .."
175 Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks on Appellate Advocacy, 50 S.C. L. REV. 567, 570 (1999), noting, "I have seen few victories
snatched at oral argument from a total defeat .... But I have seen several potential winners become losers in whole or in part
because of clarification elicited at argument.' Justice Ginsburg is obviously referring to the argument and not to counsel's
performance as an advocate. Specifically, an argument can lose a case if the lawyer can't explain the substantive answers to
questions in a way that will help the Court come to a conclusion in the lawyer's client's favor.
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Donald Verrilli in the National Federation of Independent Business v.
Sebelius,7 6 was widely panned by pundits, one of whom noted that he
"[s]ound[ed] less like a world-class lawyer and more like a teenager giving
an oral presentation for the first time."'7 7 Jeffrey Rosen derided him not for
his "nervous" presentation but rather for his failure to offer a limiting
principle despite being repeatedly pushed by the Court to do so.'7 8 In
contrast, his opponent in that case, Paul Clement, who has been described
as a "god" who gave "the argument of his life,"' 7 9 lost; Verrilli won.
Similarly in the recent case of United States v. Rodriguez,180 Attorney
O'Connor, in a nervous, stumbling, first time before the Supreme Court,
won the case for Rodriguez, despite barely being able to articulate a
complete sentence.181 Though this gives one confidence that it is not the
style of delivery that is important, it also calls into question the
importance of oral argument in the decision-making process, if, in
addition to eloquence not necessarily mattering very much, counsels'
responses are not substantively helpful.
Given the findings that the losing side gets asked more questions and
specifically more hostile questions, does oral argument really serve a
purpose if the eventual outcome of a case has essentially already been
decided and judges are using oral argument merely to confirm their
existing biases? Because oral argument has been seen as an integral part of
the appellate process, alternative justifications for it should be considered
before calling for its elimination as a general practice in the Seventh
Circuit.
V. The Functions of Oral Argument in the
Administration of Justice
A. Oral Argument Serves a Formal Function of Epitomizing
Justice Being Done
Although scholars are divided about the impact of oral argument on
the final decisions of courts, most agree that oral arguments serve the role
176 567 U.S. 519 (2012).
177 Adam Serwer, Obamas Supreme Court Disaster, MOTHER JONES (Mar. 27, 2012, 3:00 PM), http://motherjones.com/
mojo/2012/03/obamacare-supreme-court-disaster.
178 J. Lester Feder, Did Verrilli Choke and Does it Really Matter? POLITICO (Mar. 27, 2012, 06:37 PM EDT),
http://www.politico.com/story/2012/03/did-verrilli-choke-and-does-it-really-matter-074559.
179 Id.
180 135 S. Ct. 1609 (2015).
181 The oral argument is available at: http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2014/2014_13_9972. For commentary on
counsel's performance see https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2015-01-22/supreme-court-tries-to-define-a-traffic-
stop (last visited Apr. 10, 2017).
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of making justice visible.182 Since neither the parties, their advocates, nor
the public are privy to either the informal discussions about cases
conducted among judges and their clerks, nor the formal conferencing
that takes place among judges after hearing oral argument, the argument
itself serves as a visual and aural encapsulation of how justice is done,
particularly since the briefs are usually read only by the attorneys writing
them, along with the judges and their clerks. The interactions between the
judges and counsel and the specific questions asked during oral argument
serve to draw attention to the judges' concerns on various issues and
become part of the deliberative process of deciding cases by applying legal
precedent to facts. One of the functions of oral argument, therefore, is to
reinforce the notion of deliberative and process-oriented justice, since oral
argument is ostensibly open to the parties and the general public. It is a
visual manifestation of getting one's day in court.
Gregory Pingree argues that making the administration of justice
visible through mechanisms like oral argument is crucial:
Positive public perception of the judiciary's role in American political life
is indispensable to the effectiveness of the judicial branch. Indeed, this
collective perception is the very source of judicial legitimacy, the sine qua
non of our common law system.83
This justification may carry some weight in cases involving important
social issues like Baskin-Wolf 1 8 4
Whether this function holds up under closer observation is another
question altogether. One might ask to whom justice is made visible during
oral arguments, especially if one recalls that very few people are present
for most oral arguments. In most cases, only the attorneys for each side
are present; clients usually do not attend, although of course they may.
The courtroom may also contain other attorneys waiting for their cases to
be called, interested law students, or clerks. Most of those people do not
need to see justice being done; they generally know enough about how the
process works. Moreover, if an uninitiated person (e.g., a nonlawyer,
interested member of the public) really wanted to see justice being done in
appellate court, there are several obstacles to overcome. Finding out about
182 Proponents of the attitudinal approach contend that oral argument matters little because cases are decided on the basis
of the judge's political inclinations. Compare those views with Thai and Coats, supra note 45, who argue that oral argument
is symbolically important to see justice being done.
183 David R. Cleveland & Steven Wisotsky, The Decline of Oral Argument in the Federal Courts ofAppeals: A Modest
Proposalfor Reform, 13 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 119, 143 (2012) (quoting Gregory C. Pingree, Where Lies the Emperor's
Robe? An Inquiry into the Problem ofJudicial Legitimacy, 86 OR. L. REV. 1095, 1102 (2007)).
184 766 F.3d 648 (7th Cir. 2014).
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the arguments, when they are scheduled, and then getting through
security into the federal building are some of the many challenges. One
must then find the courtroom and follow somewhat dense and technical
legal arguments. The court then takes the matter under advisement, but
the public and parties are not privy to the judges' discussions during the
judicial conferences following the arguments. An interested individual
must wait several months before the decision is released and then must
decipher dense legal reasoning to unpack the gist of the opinion. Even
then, many decisions are not necessarily published, and an individual
would have to be relatively sophisticated to find the decision on the court's
website and parse its nuances. Additionally, individuals have already had
their day in court in the form of a trial below, so justice, per se, has already
been made visible.
B. The Role of Oral Argument in Assisting Judges in Delineating
Rules and Crafting Their Opinions
The role of oral argument in crafting the limits on a rule should not be
underestimated. In multiple oral arguments judges ask counsel where the
line should be drawn. For example, in the Stanojkova case both Judge
Posner and Judge Woods asked both counsel for both parties to help them
craft a test that defined what kinds of bad acts rise to the level of "perse-
cution" that warranted a granting of asylum."ss After reminding counsel
about a prior asylum-appeal case in which the court held that being beaten
with the butt of a gun and being threatened did not constitute persecution,
Judge Posner asked, "What can we do to bring some coherence to our
persecution jurisprudence?"'6 Judge Woods pursued this line of ques-
tioning, asking, "If you were writing our opinion and you got to the part
that says-here's the law of persecution, this is when it is enough and this
is when it isn't, and I think that's what Judge Posner was asking you to
draft for us. What would you say?"'8 7 Unfortunately, counsel in this
argument had no coherent response for the judges, telling the court that
"unfortunately today I was prepared to argue about the law of sexual
assault and persecution"'88 Although the court attempted to push her to
define the concept of persecution more generally and challenged her
argument that sexual assault should be treated differently from other
forms of assault in finding persecution, counsel for the appellants did not
185 http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/sound/211/migrated.orig. 10-3327_06_14_2011.mp3.
186 http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/sound/2011/migrated.orig.10-3327_06_14_2011.mp3 at the 2.15 mark. I coded this as a
neutral question.
187 Id. at 3:38.
188 Id at 2:22.
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offer the court much assistance in clarifying its general persecution
jurisprudence, merely asserting that sexual assault was "different" but
unable to articulate exactly how or why.' 89
Yet some judges contend that these types of exchanges with counsel
during oral argument can make an opinion better. For example, Justice
Burger noted that when he was on the New Jersey Supreme Court and that
court did not hear oral argument routinely, "[t]he low quality of final
judgments was traced directly to that practice. . . . Thus the New Jersey
Supreme Court rule [now] requires oral argument of every case granted
review."o90 The California Supreme Court also appears to endorse this
approach.191
Additionally, scholars have called on the Oklahoma Supreme Court to
grant oral argument, in part because they believe it will lead to better
opinions. Andrew Coats, along with his coauthor, has urged the court to
"require oral argument as a rule rather than allow it as a rare exception"192
because it "tests, refines and furthers the deliberative process."9 Thai and
Coats argued that if the court were to take the time to hear oral argument,
rather than waste the court's time, it could shorten the time needed to
decide a case, as it constitutes a "Socratic method of procedure in getting
at the real heart of an issue and in finding out where the truth lies."1 9 4
However, crafting a rule is something that judges themselves could do
during conference without oral argument. Moreover, if judges wanted the
parties' assistance on those particular matters, they could get it through
written submissions rather than require counsel to present themselves in
person to respond, often at great expense, for a procedure that routinely
lasts ten minutes.19 This would correspond more closely to the procedure
generally followed by the European Court of Human Rights.' 96 That court
189 While counsel's reluctance to engage in a broader discussion might have been a source of frustration to the judges on the
bench in that case, it is counsel's ethical obligation to be a zealous advocate for her client, i.e., to argue that the sexual assault
her client had suffered constituted persecution. The lawyer was not necessarily ethically obliged to help judges craft a broad
rule that might benefit future litigants by clarifying a particular area of law. Arguably, the duty to improve the law, required
by Paragraph 5 of the Preamble to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, might encompass this situation. See Model Rules
of Professional Conduct: Preamble & Scope, ABA CENTER FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, https://americanbar.org/
groups/professional-responsibility/publications/model-rules-of professional-conduct/model-rules-of professional
conduct-preamble-scope.html.
190 WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 11, at 10.
191 See part II supra.
192 Thai et al., supra note 45, at 716.
193 Id.
194 Id. at 717.
195 1 do acknowledge that, at its best, oral argument in the form of a conversation can help focus the court's attention on the
heart of the issue and assist the court in crafting an appropriate response to the legal issue.
196 See Rule 64(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the European Court of Human Rights, http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/
RulesCourt ENG.pdf.
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affords counsel time for oral argument (referred to as submissions) unin-
terrupted by questions. However, judges may subsequently pose questions
to counsel on the issues in the case, though the judges usually wait until
the end of counsel's submissions to do so; they generally do not interrupt
counsel.'9 7 Counsel may take some time to think about the answer to the
judges' questions before responding. This procedure would seem to allow
for a more thoughtful response than merely thinking on one's feet and
responding with whatever comes to mind.'9 '
Another option, albeit a highly impractical and expensive one, would
be to follow the example of the United Kingdom Supreme Court, where
counsel provide the court and their opponents with thick binders filled
with case authority'99 and the court and counsel look at the exact language
crafted in previous cases and discuss how it might apply in the case before
the court. The obvious downside to this approach is that arguments may
(and do) last days. The positive side is that the court releases its opinions
very promptly, often within three weeks of hearing oral argument because
the issues and authority have been canvassed so thoroughly during oral
argument.
VI. Oral Argument: A Need for Reform and Possible
Alternatives
Based on the evidence offered above, the answer to the question
about how important oral argument is to the outcome of many cases
would appear to be "not very." Oral arguments do not necessarily seem to
be the best method of helping to refine opinions or even focusing the
panel's attention on the true essence of a case. If one considers that oral
arguments in the Seventh Circuit last only ten minutes per side on short-
argument days, and that the court may hear as many as nine arguments in
a row, it might be particularly difficult for a judge to focus his or her
attention on the specifics of a case in that short amount of time, partic-
ularly after having listened to multiple previous arguments on potentially
197 See Rule 64(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the European Court of Human Rights, http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/
RulesCourtENG.pdf.
198 Of course, the argument could be made that counsel should anticipate the question during oral argument and be
prepared to respond to it.
199 Rule 22(4) of the Supreme Court Rules provides that "The appellant and every respondent (and any intervener and
advocate to the Court) must then sequentially exchange their respective written cases and file them, and every respondent
(and any intervener and advocate to the Court) must for the purposes of Rule 23 provide copies of their respective written
cases . . . ." Sup. Ct. R., https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/uksc-rules_2009.pdf. Rule 24 provides, "The volumes of
authorities that may be referred to during the hearing must be prepared in accordance with the relevant practice direction
and the requisite number of copies of the volumes of authorities must be filed .. . Sup. Ct. R. 24 (U.K.), https://www.supre-
mecourt.uk/docs/uksc rules_2009.pdf.
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completely different areas of the law. Moreover, as the study shows, oral
arguments may be dominated by one particular judge who might have an
axe to grind on an issue.
Additionally, oral arguments seem to only generally change judges'
minds in a limited number of cases.2 00 In many of the cases I studied, the
tone, nature, content and number of the questions posed by the judges
seemed to indicate the judge had already made up his or her mind on the
matter, and it was going to be essentially impossible for counsel to change
the judge's mind. Because confirmation bias appears to influence the tone
and content of a judge's questions, oral argument seems to serve in many
cases as a means of justifying a judge's initial decision on a case. This does
not seem an effective use of a judge's time.
Moreover, oral arguments are only one step in the process of turning
out a final opinion on the case. Even if oral arguments were to succeed in
changing a judge's initial leanings on a case, it is not always clear that a
judge's newfound view of the case would prevail. Judges vote on the case
during judicial conferences, and if one then realized that one's other two
colleagues felt differently about the case, a judge might change her mind
once again at that point. Judges are also free to change their minds when
writing an opinion or when drafts of opinions are circulated, and also
might come to feel differently about a case during discussions with their
clerks.2 01
Given that oral argument may serve little useful purpose in many
cases, one must then consider the alternatives, particularly given the
precedent-making function of courts of appeals. The role of a federal court
of appeals like the Seventh Circuit is not only to decide the outcome of a
particular appeal but to craft precedent for that circuit. This is a partic-
ularly important function given the small number of cases granted
certiorari by the United States Supreme Court.2 02 A court of appeals is
thus very interested in how its decision should be crafted, as that decision
essentially articulates a rule for similar cases. Based on the arguments I
listened to, counsel were often unable to articulate a good response to that
type of question. Moreover, counsel often seemed taken aback by some of
the questions posed by the court and did not articulate effective responses
200 In my study the number appears to be about ten percent.
201 Judges acknowledge that sometime the opinion "just won't write.' See Justice Scalia's comments to the ABA in
Appellate Issues in Gaetan Gerville-Rdache, Justice Scalia at the AJEl Summit in New Orleans, APP. ISSUES 4 (2013),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/appellate-issues/2013win ai.authcheckdam.pdf.
202 In 2014 the Court's caseload was the lightest it has ever been, at 71 cases. According to the 538 blog, there has been a
downward trend in the number of cases the Court hears. See The Supreme Court' Caseload is on Track to be the Lightest in
Seventy Years, https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/the-supreme-courts-caseload-is-on-track-to-be-the-lightest-in-70-years/
(last visited Apr. 13, 2017).
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to questions that caught them off-guard. Judge Posner has noted that the
quality of oral argument in federal lower courts and the Supreme Court is
not good.203 It might therefore be more effective to email counsel
questions that the court would like addressed and give counsel a short
time to respond in writing to those questions. It would also be more cost-
and time-effective, as counsel would not have to attend argument in
person. Similarly, judicial resources would be put to better use, as the
judges could read counsel's responses to questions at a time when they are
not tired. The Seventh Circuit routinely listens to up to nine arguments in
a row on short-argument days, which has to be extremely tiring for judges.
If they do not have counsel before them, judges may also be less likely to
become annoyed or irritated at counsel and less likely to allow that
annoyance to color their view of counsel's argument.2 0 4
VII. Conclusion
Although this is a small study, both in the number of cases and the
number of judges examined, it seems to suggest that confirmation bias
may be one of the factors at work in the types of questions that judges
pose to counsel for litigants against whom they ultimately rule.
Confirmation bias manifests itself in the number and tone of questions
posed to a side that ultimately loses the case. Tuchman's theory that "all
subsequent activity becomes an effort to justify it" 205 when confirmation
bias is present seems to be born out often with respect to oral argument.
Although Judge Posner believes that experience and temperament can
help judges counteract their "priors," 2 0 6 confirmation biases may be so
entrenched that judges themselves may not realize they are present.
Courts should carefully consider the merits of an appeal before
granting oral argument. Oral argument should be granted only for cases
for which two judges are confident that oral argument could make a
difference in the outcome, or for cases that are highly important to the
public. On cases for which courts do decide to grant oral argument, judges
should be mindful of their biases and their tone, and of the number and
content of their questions so that they do not seek to reinforce already
existing leanings.
203 See Posner, supra note 56, although he did concede that 205 Cited in Nickerson, supra note 99, at 191.
it can be helpful to judges. 206 "Although the average quality of oral argument in
204 It is difficult not to speculate, for example, about the federal courts (including the Supreme Court) is not high, the
role that Judge Posner's obvious annoyance with Matthew value of oral argument to judges is very high." RICHARD A.
Kairis might have played in the outcome of the University of POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM
Notre Dame v. Sebelius case. 160-61 (1999).
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